Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002300030012-7

DIAIS 239-73 12 OCTOBER 1973 AS OF: 0500 EDT (0900Z)











DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

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Published by the Deputy Director for Intelligence

SUMMARY

OFFICIAL: 25X1DIA Colonel, USMC Senior Duty Officer

MIDDLE EAST

The Israelis have penetrated about seven miles past the 1967 cease-fire line on the Golan Heights. The Suez front remains relatively static -- while Israeli forces are containing Egyptian movements eastward.

1

EGYPT-SYRIA

The cost to the Soviets for replacing Egyptian and Syrian equipment losses so far in the Middle East war will amount to over 500 million dollars.

3

CUBA

25X1DIA

Army troops have reportedly improved positions near the Guantanamo Naval Base in preparation for possible military action.

5

PEOPLES

REPUBLIC OF CHINA

Peking has given no indication that it plans to intervene militarily in the Middle East, but its diplomatic and propaganda support for the Arabs continues.

7

USSR Soviet photoreconnaissance satellite

coverage of the Middle East has increased

during the past week.

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12 Oct 73

DIA INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

DIAIS 239-73

SUMMARY

CAMBODIA	Cambodian forces reopened Route 4 yesterday but the enemy continues to pressure two friendly garrisons on Route 5. The Soviets move to recognize Sihanouk's exile government.	, 8
LAOS	The JCIA, charged with negotiating the military details of the Lao peace settlement, is preparing for the deployment of Pathet Lao personnel to Vientiane and Luang Prabang.	10
THAILAND	The government has formed a special task group to handle possible widespread student political demonstrations.	11
PHILIPPINES	Maoists remain preoccupied with expanding their popular base and areas of activity, but there is no evidence of cooperation with Muslim rebels.	13
BRIEFS	Libya, Uganda, Pakistan, Republic of China-Cambodia, Chile, Brazil, and USSR.	14-17

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MIDDLE EAST

THE ISRAELIS HAVE PENETRATED ABOUT SEVEN MILES (12 KILOMETERS) PAST THE 1967 CEASE-FIRE LINE ON THE GOLAN HEIGHTS AND AFTER CONSOLIDATING THEIR POSITION COULD THREATEN DAMASCUS. ISRAELI AIR ACTIVITY OVER SYRIA REMAINS HEAVY. THE SUEZ FRONT REMAINS RELATIVELY STATIC -- WHILE ISRAELI FORCES ARE CONTAINING EGYPTIAN MOVEMENTS EASTWARD.

The Israeli breakthrough was between Mount Hermon and the Qneitra-Damascus road, and now their ground units are only 30 miles (48 kilometers) from the Syrian capital. The Israelis have options of continuing north to Damascus, attacking eastward to bypass Syrian static defenses, or swinging south to encircle Syrian ground units on the first defense line.

	aircraft involved in yes-
	d barrage firings of SAMS, in-
cluding a high percentage of	f SA-6/GAINFUL missiles which
downed five Israeli aircraft	:.
this indicates rece	ent deliveries of SAMs by the
Soviet airlift.	

The Israelis say they downed 19 Syrian aircraft in air combat on the 10th and seven yesterday. This brings the cumulative kill total to 91 and leaves some 263 fighter aircraft in the Syrian inventory. Pilot shortages in the Syrian Air Force have greatly degraded Syrian capability to defend Syrian air space. Israeli aircraft made strikes against six Syrian airfields yesterday including Damascus International; 12 Israeli fighters were lost on both fronts yesterday.


Israeli SAAR-class guided-missile patrol boats attacked Tartus port last night. Three ships were hit by probable GABRIEL surface-to-surface missiles. The Soviet

(Continued)

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merchant ship ILYA MECHNIKOV was hit, and later sank but no personnel casualties were reported. Two Syrian KOMARs were hit and later sank.

The situation on the Sinai front remains unchanged from yesterday with little ground activity noted. Israeli successes on the northern front may permit transfers of 25 Israeli tank units to the Sinai.

LATEST INFO: 12 Oct 73

COST ESTIMATES OF EGYPTIAN AND SYRIAN MAJOR EQUIPMENT LOSSES AS OF 1700 EDT 12 OCTOBER 1973

Equipment	Estimated Number Lost	Unit* Trade Price\$	1972 Unit** Production Cost \$	Total Trade Price \$	1972 Total Production Cost \$
		EG [*]	YPT		
Aircraft MI-8 MIG-21 MIG-17/19	19 30 38	600,000 945,000 250,000	1,300,000 1,600,000 1,000,000	11,400,000 28,350,000 9,500,000	24,700,000 48,000,000 38,000,000
Tanks PT-76 T-54/55	11 240	60,000 121,900	77,300 168,600	660,000 29,256,000	850,300 40,464,000
Ships OSA PTFG KOMAR PTG Total	3 2	3,333,000 705,600	3,400,000 2,100,000	9,999,000 1,411,200 90,576,200	10,200,000 4,200,000 186,288,620
		SY	RIA		
		-			
Aircraft MIG-21 SU-7	88 3	945,000 866,000	1,600,000 2,700,000	83,160,000 2,598,00	140,800,000
Tanks T-54/55 T-62	550 125	121,900 175,000	168,600 175,000	67,045,000 21,875,000	92,730,000 21,875,000
Ships KOMAR PTG P-6 PT VANYA MSC Total	3 1 1	705,600 603,820 3,000,000	2,100,000 900,000 3,000,000 60,524,300 1	2,116,800 603,820 3,000,000 160,524,300	6,300,000 900,000 3,000,000 273,705,000

^{*} Trade prices are determined by the Soviets in terms of the political advantage they see in providing military assistance to any given country. Both Syria and Egypt have been given substantial discounts.

(SECRET)

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^{**}Production cost estimates are based on what these items would cost if they were produced in the quantities the Soviets have manufactured.

EGYPT - SYRIA

THE COST TO THE SOVIETS FOR REPLACING MAJOR EQUIPMENT LOST BY EGYPT AND SYRIA SO FAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST WAR WILL AMOUNT TO OVER 500 MILLION DOLLARS.

As of yesterday, Egypt had lost some 68 fighters, 19 helicopters, 251 tanks, and five small naval surface craft. It is estimated that it will cost about \$86 million to replace the 30 MIG-21/FISHBEDs and 38 MIG-17/19s, \$25 million for the 19 helicopters, and over \$50 million for the tanks.

Syrian losses include 88 MIG-21s and three SU-7/FITTERs, 675 tanks, and five small naval surface craft. Total replacement cost is estimated to be some eight million dollars for the FITTERs, \$140 million for the FISHBEDs, some \$104 million for the tanks, and about \$10 million for the naval craft.

The cost of Soviet military assistance equipment is determined by the political advantage the Soviets believe they can gain. Thus Egypt and Syria have been given substantial discounts in the past which should reduce the overall replacement cost to Egypt and Syria. (SECRET GDS-31 Dec 81)

CUBA

ARMY TROOPS HAVE REPORTEDLY IMPROVED POSITIONS NEAR THE GUANTANAMO NAVAL BASE IN PREPARATION FOR POSSIBLE MILI-TARY ACTION. PRIME MINISTER CASTRO HAS, HOWEVER, LONG USED SUCH PLOYS AS LEVERS IN US-CUBAN POLITICAL ISSUES.

Some 600 Cuban military personnel are said to be working around the clock on air-raid shelters, trenches, and barracks about three miles (five kilometers) northeast of the main gate to Guantanamo. Base personnel have not been able to observe the area but report no activity near the base fence | however, reportedly said an attack on the base is "inevitable."

The Cubans apparently believe the 2 October seizure of their merchant ship IMIAS in the Panama Canal presages permanent closure of the Canal to Cuban transit. In line with this, Cuba's Ambassador to Peru has claimed that his country's armed forces are on alert in response to the seizure. sources do not confirm an islandwide alert but note that an increased military posture in only one area of Cuba could go unnoticed.

Castro has historically used the Guantanamo issue to rouse public fervor for confrontations with the US. The base has been a major target for protest or pressure in almost every clash of US and Cuban interests since 1964. Cuba has made extensive plans for attacks and incidents at Guantanamo in the past, but all have been called off by Castro before being implemented. These latest preparations may be under way, but it is doubtful that the Prime Minister would risk confrontation with the US over a ship seizure that is legal by international law.

PREPARED BY: Western Area Division (DI-5) SOURCES:

COMNAVBASE GTMO BAY, Cuba 101935Z

Oct 73 (S/NFD)

LATEST INFO: 10 Oct 73


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LATEST INFO: 11 Oct 73

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PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA

PEKING HAS GIVEN NO INDICATION THAT IT PLANS TO INTERVENE MILITARILY IN THE MIDDLE EAST, BUT ITS DIPLOMATIC AND PROPAGANDA SUPPORT FOR THE ARAB CAUSE CONTINUES.

	25>
does not	
plan to intervene directly in the Middle East fight-	
ing and has not committed arms or equipment to the	
Arabs. China would consider supplying	
arms only if the US and USSR conspired to deprive	
Arab states of their rightful territory.	25X
the Arabs presently have adequate	20/
weapons, and there is no indication Moscow will stop	
resupplying ammunition or spare parts. Peking has,	
however, continued its political support. In mes-	
sages to the Presidents of Egypt and Syria yesterday,	
Premier Chou En-lai condemned Israeli aggression and	
reaffirmed his country's support for the Arab cause.	1
However, he did not imply that any materiel assist-	Į.
ance would be forthcoming.	
Although pleased by Arab successes, Peking is apparently taking a wait-and-see attitude toward	·
the current crisis. It will undoubtedly continue diplomatic and propaganda support to increase its	
influence at the expense of the USSR. At the same	l
time, Peking is leaving the door open to attribute	
a possible Arab setback to US-Soviet collusion.	
Future military aid cannot be ruled out, but grants	
would be limited since Peking realizes it cannot	
compete with Moscow in the assistance area.	25
	23/
PREPARED BY: China-Asia Division (DI-4)	
SOURCES:	05V4A
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LATEST INFO: 11 Oct 73	

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USSR

SOVIET PHOTORECONNAISSANCE SATELLITE COVERAGE OF THE MIDDLE EAST HAS INCREASED DURING THE PAST WEEK.

The launches of COSMOS 596 on 3 October, COSMOS 597 on the 6th, and COSMOS 598 on the 10th as well as the early recovery of COSMOS 596 six days earlier than normal on the 9th have provided the Soviets with an extensive potential for photographic coverage of the Middle East. COSMOS 596 had probably expended about two-thirds of its film and by the 9th had drifted too far west to obtain additional coverage of the Middle East. COSMOS 596 was in an orbital pattern that covered Egypt, the Sinai, Israel, and Syria.


COSMOS 597 and 598

were also in orbital patterns that cover the Middle East. COSMOS 597 was launched within one hour after the hostilities started. Its orbit was corrected on the 8th to reduce an apparent westward drift, and the vehicle has been passing over the Middle East daily since then. As anticipated, COSMOS 597 was deorbited on revolution 93 this morning after completing an abbreviated six-day mission. Orbital parameters of COSMOS 598, which may also have a shortened mission, indicate the vehicle will pass over the area about noon. Electronic intelligence coverage of the Middle East has also increased since mid-September.

PREPARED BY: Soviet-Warsaw Pact Area Division (DI-3)

SOURCE: DIA Analysis (S) LATEST INFO: 11 Oct 73

ROUTE 4 WAS REOPENED YESTERDAY, BUT LITTLE PROGRESS IS REPORTED IN CLEARING ROUTE 5



control or vacated

CAMBODIA

CAMBODIAN FORCES REOPENED ROUTE 4 YESTER-DAY, BUT THE ENEMY CONTINUES TO PRESSURE TWO FRIENDLY GARRISONS ON ROUTE 5. THE SOVIETS MOVE TO RECOGNIZE SIHANOUK'S EXILE GOVERNMENT.

Cambodian forces reopened Route 4 yesterday against apparent light enemy resistance. The attacking force moved west and linked up with other friendly units that had been in blocking positions along the western end of the enemy held section of the road. Friendly forces captured a large quantity of ammunition and several weapons of mixed caliber. Convovs have been scheduled for today and tomorrow.

Meanwhile,

ROUTE 5 remains closed and the enemy continues his attacks by fire and ground probes against Tuk Laak and Sala Lek Pram.

South of the capital, Cambodian forces made limited progress yesterday in retaking Route 201, between Routes 2 and 3. Ground forces were supported by Cambodian Air Force T-28 aircraft.

In Phnom Penh, terrorists threw three grenades into a group of civilians near the Royal Palace wounding 23. One of the terrorists was captured while two others escaped.

In political developments, the USSR informed Prince Sihanouk on 9 October through the resident Soviet Ambassador to Peking that it regards his government-in-exile as the "real" representative of the Cambodian people. The USSR has maintained diplomatic relations with the Lon Nol government since Sihanouk's ouster in March 1970. Although this shift toward Sihanouk does not amount to an official recognition of his government, it does represent a major setback for the Lon Nol government, especially at the United Nations where a significant debate is developing on which government should be recognized as the legal representative of Cambodia.

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The Soviets iterated to Sihanouk that instructions had been passed to their UN delegation to treat the Sihanouk government as the legal representative in the forthcoming credentials debate.

The Soviets apparently feel that the Prince will play an important role in any future negotiations involving a settlement of the Cambodian conflict and do not want to be on the losing side, especially if the Khmer Communists topple the Lon Nol government. They have been warming toward Sihanouk since the strong enemy offensive around Phnom Penh in June and July.

PREPARED BY: Southeast Asia Division (DI-6)

PREPARED BY: Southeast Asia Division (DI-6)

LATEST INFO: 0430 EDT 12 Oct 73

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LAOS

THE JOINT COMMISSION TO IMPLEMENT THE AGREEMENT (JCIA) HELD ITS FIRST MEETING YESTERDAY AND IS PREPARING FOR THE DE-PLOYMENT OF ABOUT 200 PATHET LAO PERSONNEL TO VIENTIANE AND LUANG PRABANG.

The JCIA is a joint Pathet Lao-Royal Lao Government committee charged with negotiating the military details of the Lao peace settlement. Its first task will be to coordinate the reception of contingents of Pathet Lao officials and security forces in the two capital cities; the groups are to arrive within the next four days. One contingent of 80 to 100 Pathet Lao is to be flown from Hanoi to Vientiane today by Soviet AN-12/CUB aircraft.

Peking has also offered airlift support in an apparent effort not to be outdone by the Soviets and to demonstrate its continued interest in northwestern Laos. China is to transport a similar-size Pathet Lao group from Sam Neua to Luang Prabang aboard IL-14/CRATEs on 15 October.

Because of the imminent Pathet Lao arrivals, the
JCIA is not expected to address PW and MIA questions
soon, and the 14 October deadline to exchange PW-MIA
lists will probably be delayed.
PREPARED BY: Southeast Asia Division (DT-6)

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THAILAND

THE GOVERNMENT HAS FORMED A SPECIAL TASK GROUP TO HANDLE POSSIBLE WIDESPREAD STUDENT POLITICAL DEMONSTRATIONS. KING HAS COUNSELED THE PRIME MINISTER TO AVOID VIOLENCE AND TRY TO CONVINCE THE STUDENTS THEY ARE BEING USED BY ANTIGOVERNMENT FACTIONS.

Last week's arrest of leftist politicians and student activists is causing a growing wave of protest from Bangkok students. So far, reaction has been restricted to university campuses in the Bangkok area. However, concern is increasing that rabblerousers and parties interested in embarrassing the government will try to incite large-scale demonstrations in the capital.

The special task unit is directed by Field Marshal Praphat and Gen Krit. The two officers are the most powerful figures in the government after Prime Minister Thanom. The force will utilize existing civilian, police, and military counterinsurgency resources and can make arrests or use force without consulting the Cabinet. The task group has the concurrence of the King, but he has strongly advised against any student bloodshed.

Despite government claims that communist provocateurs are causing the current trouble, there is no conclusive evidence this or other antigovernment factions are trying to exploit student-backed demands for early promulgation of a constitution into an effort to overthrow the government. Whether this strong response is to head off protests planned for November or a reaction to student involvement with

(Continued)

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leftists politicians, the rapidly expanding student support makes this protest one of the most serious challenges to the Thai Government in recent years. The situation is regarded as an internal Thai problem and no mention has been made of the "continued US presence" in the country.

PREPARED BY: Southeast Asia Division (DI-6) SOURCES:

Emb Bangkok 15919 11 Oct 73 (C)

LATEST INFO: 11 Oct 73

PHILIPPINES

MAOISTS REMAIN PREOCCUPIED WITH EXPANDING THEIR POPULAR BASE AND AREAS OF ACTIVITY, BUT THERE IS STILL NO EVIDENCE OF COOPERATION WITH MUSLIM REBELS.

the New Peoples
Army is now operating in about half the provinces, or
twice as many as a year ago. A three-fold expansion
in the Maoist support base is also claimed along with
major victories in two recent engagements with security
forces.

Lack of increased political or military activities deflates the insurgents' claims, despite indications of gradual expansion throughout the islands. The two minor firefights on Luzon have been the only contacts between the government and insurgent forces in several months. The Maoists are generally avoiding contact with security forces and are stressing training, recruitment, and popular base development. Nevertheless, they retain the capability to disrupt security in outlying areas.

PREPARED BY: China-Asia Division (DI-4)
SOURCE:


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LIBYA EXTENDS TERRITORIAL WATERS IN GULF OF SIDRA



BRIEFS

LIBYA: The government claimed sovereignty over the Gulf of Sidra (Sirte) on 10 October, fixed the northern limit of its jurisdiction at 32°30'N, and warned that all shipping must obtain permission before entering the area. The move provides an additional restricted area east of the unilaterally proclaimed 100-nm (185-km) zone around Tripoli. Most of Libya's oil terminals are on the Gulf of Sidra, and the port of Benghazi is also within the new prohibited zone. Tripoli was probably motivated by concern for coastline defense because of the current hostilities in the Middle East.

Western Area Division (DI-5)

SOURCES: Emb Tripoli 1302 10 Oct 73 (C) and DIA Analysis (C/NFD)

LIBYA: Tripoli Radio has announced that a Lebanese freighter entered a minefield in Libyan territorial waters on 10 October, hit a mine, and sank. Air force helicopters rescued the 12-man crew. The sinking may have been in the minefield laid off Okba ibn Nafa Air Base last June, in which one Greek ship was sunk and another damaged. The incident points up the continuing danger to shipping along the Libyan coast.

Western Area Division (DI-5)

SOURCES: Press 11 Oct 73 (U) and DIA Analysis (C/NFD)

UGANDA: President Amin's warning that Kampala will break relations with Washington and jail all 276 Americans in the country if the US actively sides with Israel in the current Middle East struggle is intended to gain him favor with Arab leaders in Cairo and Damascus. Amin was referring to movements of the US Sixth Fleet, but he brushed aside assurances by the US Charge that such activities were undertaken to ensure the safety of American nationals in danger areas. Although the President has demonstrated vocal displeasure with the US in the past, he has refrained from serious action against Americans. However, he is mercurial and could act rashly.

Western Area Division (DI-5)

SOURCES: Emb Kampala 3000 11 Oct 73 (C) and DIA Analysis (C/NFD)

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
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THE AIR FORCE WILL SOON ACQUIRE ADDITIONAL MIRAGE 5 AIRCRAFT



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PAKISTAN: all of the remaining France by in Novembe January. MIRAGE 5s	By early next year the air force will e 30 MIRAGE 5s it is buying from Paris. nine to 11 aircraft are to be flown from Pakistani pilots in two increments or er and the other in late December or ear. These aircraft will probably join the or already stationed at Shorkot Road. The will be used by the air force in a ground	The m ne ly ther	. 1
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	a Division (DI-4)		25X
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CHILE: Sporadic attacks in Santiago, Valparaiso, and Talcahuano may represent initial efforts by leftist extremists to renew operations against the junta. Since 7 October, five assaults by as many as 20 to 40 extremists on military or police installations have been reported. Security forces have easily coped with these attacks but fear increased violence as the extremists become better organized.

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Western Area Division (DI-5)
SOURCES:

25X1A

Emb Santiago 4929 10 Oct 73 (C)

BRAZIL: The government is favorably disposed toward the military takeover in Chile and will reportedly aid the junta in every way possible. It will send Chile 40,000 metric tons of unrefined sugar in late October to maintain production in refineries that would otherwise be forced to lay off many workers. The sugar has been diverted from paid-up accounts, and Chile's payment will be deferred. The Brazilian Government's willingness to undergo a measure of economic discomfort reflects a desire to see the Chilean military junta remain in office -- an investment Brazil undoubtedly sees as yielding future dividends.

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Western Area Division (DI-5)

SOURCE:

25X1A

BRAZIL: President Medici will probably approve an 8 October recommendation to raise the army's authorized personnel strength ceiling from 178,000 to 250,000. The increase would be implemented over several years, provide manpower for the army's Amazon development task, and be consistent with the armed forces' ongoing modernization and reorganization program. The navy and air force can also be expected to request similar increases.

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Western Area Division (DI-5)
SOURCE:

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